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The Causes and Consequences
of Leveraged Buyouts
N THE MARKET for corporate control during
the past decade, leveraged buyouts have become
increasingly popular. Many observers, speculat-
ing about the causes of this recent trend, have
expressed concern about the potential problems
arising from such activity.’ Implicit in many
casual discussions is the assumption that
leveraged buyouts—hereafter LBOs—are merely
some type of cosmetic surgery. That is, an LBO
has no impact on the productive capacity of the
target firm, while unjustifiably inflating the
value of the stock.
Under this assumption, any observed gains to
the existing shareholders of the target firm are
likely to be matched, if not dominated, by losses
to others; since there is no net gain and possibly
a loss to society, LBO activity should be re-
stricted. Some analysts also argue that LBOs
have contributed to the unprecedented growth
of outstanding debt in recent years. If, as many
contend, the large growth in debt is associated
with increased instability in the financial sys-
tem, public policy might aim to reverse or at
least curb debt growth. In addition, tax reform
might be an appropriate way to reduce this
debt growth, if it stems chiefly from tax incen-
tives.
This article examines whether LBOs have had
a productive impact on the target firm. If eco-
nomic theory and evidence suggest that LBOs
generally are productive, then arguments for
legal restrictions on LBO activity are less per-
suasive. Alternatively, if there are few, if any,
gains from LBOs, the idea that LBOs pose a
problem for the economy might be valid.
WHAT ARE LBOs?
Despite the ever-expanding literature on LBOs,
there does not appear to be a single, clear defi-
nition of what an LBO really is. Loosely speak-
ing, an LBO is simply the purchase of a firm by
an outside individual, another firm or the in-
cumbent management with the purchase being
financed by large amounts of debt; the resulting
firm is said to be “highly leveraged.” The target
firm can be a free-standing entity or a division
of a public corporation.’ Although the target of
the LBO can be a private firm, recent discus-
sions about LBO activity have focused primarily
‘For exampte, see Lowenstein (1986), “When Industry Bor-
rows Itself” (1988), Friedman (1989) and Kaufman (1989).
‘When the target of an LBO is a division of a public com-
pany, the transaction is typically catted a “management
buyout.” Stancitt (1988), p. 18, who points out that LBO
activity targeting smatter (private) firms is not a new
phenomenon, provides a very generat definition of an
LBO: “whenever a buyer tacks the requisite cash and bor-
rows part of the purchase price against the target com-
pany’s assets (receivables, equipment, inventory, real
estate) or cash flow (future cash), that’s an LBO.”
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on instances in which a public firm is taken
private.’ Upon this type of transaction, the
target firm’s stock shares are no longer traded
publicly in equity markets.
The greatest ambiguity about what constitutes
an LBO concerns the degree to which the pur-
chase is financed with debt.~Typically, debt
finance provides about 80 percent to 90 percent
of the funds for the purchase. Equity finance,
in which the resulting shares are held by the
purchasers of the target firm and, often, an out-
side investment group, provides the remaining
funds.’
Debt Finance in an LBO
Two types of debt are usually employed in an
LBO transaction: senior debt and subordinated
debt. Senior debt typically accounts for the
greatest proportion, usually 50 percent to 60
percent, of financing for the LBO. Sometimes
called secured debt, senior debt specifies a lien
on a particular piece of property. In the case
that the firm’s earnings are insufficient to ser-
vice the firm’s debt obligations fully, the holders
of senior debt can have the pledged property
sold to recover the unpaid interest and prin-
cipal. Funds through senior debt are often pro-
vided by commercial banks, insurance com-
panies, leasing companies and limited partner-
ships specializing in LBOs and venture capital
investments.6
Subordinated debt, or “mezzanine” debt, is
considered to be more speculative than senior
debt because it is issued without a lien against
specified property. Although the holders of sub-
ordinated debt are protected in the case of de-
fault, only assets not pledged explicitly and any
cash remaining after paying other creditors are
available to satisfy these unsecured claims. Ac-
counting for about 30 percent of the financing
for the transaction, subordinated debt is usually
provided by pension funds, insurance com-
panies and limited partnerships.~
In many LBOs, after the purchase, the new
owners sell some of the firm’s assets and use
the proceeds to retire some of the debt. Cash
flows from continued operations are used to
service the remaining debt obligations.
Key Features of Recent LBOs
The typical LBO in recent years has two in-
teresting characteristics that distinguish it fi-om
other takeover and merger activities. First, the
equity of the target firm usually is held by fewer
individuals following the financial reorganiza-
tion. This increased concentration of ownership
is especially typical of a “going-private” transac-
tion in which the stock is no longer publicly
traded.~
Second, although alternative sources of funds
are available to obtain corporate ownership,
going-private transactions usually are financed
heavily with debt, leaving the target firm in a
highly leveraged position. In essence, the tran-
saction involves a substitution of debt for equi-
ty. For example, in a sample of 58 LBOs be-
tween 1980 to 1984, the average debt-to-equity
ratio rose from 0.457 to 5.524, a percentage
change exceeding 1100 percent.9
The higher degree of leveraging means that a
larger proportion of claims against the target
firm’s assets and operations are fixed obliga-
tions. Because holders of these claims can push
the firm into bankruptcy if these obligations are
not met fully, the greater leveraging, holding all
else constant, erodes the target firm’s insulation
from unexpected declines in earnings and,
hence, increases the firm’s risk of bankruptcy.
RECENT TRENDS IN LBO
ACTIVITY
The following discussion defines an LBO as a
highly leveraged, going-private transaction. ‘this
‘See Lehn and Poutsen (1988, 1989) and “Corporate
America Snuggles Up to the Buy-Out Wolves” (1988), for
exampte. DeAngelo, DeAngeto and Rice (1984), p. 370,
use a narrower definition by making a distinction between
pure going-private transactions, where “incumbent
management seeks comptete equity ownership ofthe sur-
viving corporation,” and leveraged buyouts, where
“management proposes to share equity ownership in the
subsequent private firm with third-party investors.”
4The Federal Reserve Board recently established a set of
guidelines for banks involved in a broader ctass of leverag-
ed financing, catted “highly leveraged financing.” This
class of leveraging includes atl borrowers having debt-to-
total-asset ratios exceeding 75 percent. See “Board Issues
Guidelines for LBO, Other Highly Leveraged Loans
(1989). Although LBOs are included in this class, they
have not been specifically defined by the Federal Reserve
System.
‘Thomson (1989) and Lehn and Poulsen (1988, 1989).
~tbid.
‘ibid.
‘Many of these firms, however, subsequently go public.
‘Lehn and Poulsen (1988), table 2, p. 48.
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narrow focus permtts the discus ion to address
recent concerns about I BO activity that appear
to revolve around those transactions in which
public firms are taken private primarily through
debt financing.
As shown in table 1, the number of going-
private transactions in 1988 was nearly eight
times that in 1979.’°Just in the past year, the
incidence of these transactions has more than
doubled. Furthermore, the table indicates that
the average as well as the median purchase
price rose dramatically over the same period. In
1979, the avet age purchase price was $39.8
million, whereas in 1988 it was $487.4 million.
the aver-age purchase price rose at an annual
rate of 32 1 percent, nearly three times the 11.1










firms included in the New York Stock Exchange.
Even accounting for inflation, the increase in
the average purchase price was substantial—
fiom $50.6 million to $400.5 million in 1982
prices, a real annual growth rate of 25.8
percent.
While the average purchase price generally
rose during the 1980s, the “premium” or the
price paid for these firms above their- initial
market value (the value of their stock shares
before the initial announcement) as a percent-
age of the market value has been relatively
stable. As table 2 shows, average and median
premiums paid over the prior market price of
the target firms from 1979 to 1988 have been
quite large. Even excluding the extremely large
1979 values, the aveiage and median premiums
averaged about 36.3 percent and 30.6 percent,
respectively.11 These large premiums indicate
‘°MerrillLynch Business Brokerage and Valuation, Inc.
(1988) reports, “Like the majority of unit management
buyouts, most, if not alt, of the ‘going private’ transactions
also are leveraged buyouts, i.e., transactions in which the
buyers put up onty a small part of the purchase price and
borrow the rest.” (p. 91) Management buyouts have also
increased less markedly, from 59 in 1979 to 89 in 1988.
See Merrill Lynch Business Brokerage and Valuation, Inc.
(1988), p. 82.
“Lehn and Poutsen (1988), table 5, p. 52, report the
premiums, as determined in the market, for the target
firms of LBOs included in the COMPUSTAT data tape be-
tween 1980 and 1984. The “market-valued” premium was
measured as the percentage increase in the stock price
from 20 days before the LBO announcement until the day
of the announcement for LBOs between 1980 and 1984.
They find that market-vatued premium as a percentage of
the market price before the announcement averaged 39.5
percent, ranging from 1.7 percent to 120 percent. During
the same period, the “cash-offer” premium (the cash offer
above the market price 20 days before the announcement)
as a fraction of the market price ranged from 2 percent to
120 percent, averaging 41 percent. The sample standard
deviation of both these premiums was 23.2 percent.
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that the target firm’s stockholders have cap-
tured significant capital gains upon the LBO
transaction.”
ARE LBOs PRODUCTIVE?~SOME
FINANCE -THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The growing incidence of LBO activity in the
market for corporate control has sparked many
to question the social value of this activity.
Many expressed concerns are predicated im-
plicitly on the notion that the changes in the
firm’s financial structure associated with the
LBO transaction have no positive real effects on
that firm’s output. If the transaction were mere-
ly a device to realize some short~termgain, at
the expense of long-term growth and a reduc-
tion in social wealth, then these concerns would
be justified.
Finance theory, however, suggests that LBOs
can be productive. The gains derive from two
key features of LBOs in recent years—namely,
going private and highly leveraged financing.
These related features permit a reorganization
of the firm to alter its incentive structure and
produce an increase in its earnings potential.
The Advantages of Going Private
The theory of corporate finance shows how
the distinction between ownership and control,
or equivalently the differences between the in-
centives and constraints of the firm’s
stockholders and those of the firm’s managers,
can have important implications for the perfor-
mance of the firm. Specifically, this distinction
can create a situation in which the firm does
not achieve its maximum earnings potential—
that is, the firm is not being run efficiently
from the stockholder’s perspective.” By going
private, the distinction is removed and earnings
can increase.”
If the manager’s actions were monitored easily
and costlessly, going-private transactions would
have no implications for the performance of the
firm. A contract for compensating the manager
could be designed by the owners to encourage
the manager to act entirely on their behalf. The
ideal contract would specify the appropriate ac-
tions to be taken by the manager to maximize
the firm’s value under all possible contingencies;
the contract would penalize the manager if he
failed to act in accordance with its specifica-
tions, thereby ensuring that the manager always
acted in the interests of the owners.
The efficacy of such contracts, however,
hinges on the ability and costs of monitoring.
Typically, the firm’s owners do not observe the
actions of the managers directly, nor are they
fully aware of the economic environment (specif-
ic to the firm) in which a manager’s decisions
are made. For example, owners do not have
complete information about the firm’s oppor-
tunities for investment and growth or about the
daily events that influence a manager’s deci-
sions. Holding all else constant, as the number
of the holders of the firm’s stock increases,—
that is, as the firm’s ownership becomes more
dispersed—the potential gains realized by one
owner monitoring the manager’s actions decline,
because the potential net gains that the individual
can capture become smaller relative to the costs
he incurs. In this case, monitoring activity de-
clines and contracts designed to align the man-
I2Also, see DeAngeto, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Torab-
zadeh and Bertin (1987) and Lehn and Poutsen (1988,
1989), who find that announcements of LBOs have signifi-
cant positive effects on the target firm’s stock price. For
example, Lehn and Poutsen (1989, p. 776) calculate the
average daily return from holding the stock of the target
firm of the LBO for various holding periods, abstracting
from movements in the firm’s stock price due to economy-
wide factors. They find that the “cumulative average daily
abnormal return” (CAR) from 20 days before to 20 days
after the LBO announcement averaged 20.54 percent
across the firms included in the sample during the period
1980-87. This means that an individual buying a stock of
an LBO target 20 days before the announcement and then
selling it 20 days after the announcement could have
made a 20.5 percent return on average above a normat
(the market) return over the same period. Even holding the
stock from one day before the announcement until the end
of the announcement day yielded, on average, a CAR of
16.3 percent, a return too high to be attributed solely to
chance. Similarly, for the period 1973-80, DeAngeto,
DeAngelo and Rice (1984), pp. 394-95, estimate a signifi-
cant CAR of 16.99 percent for the same holding period.
“For example, see Manne (1965) and Jensen and Meckting
(1976).
“Another gain from going private, which is more obvious,
involves circumventing the explicit costs that are otherwise
incurred with outside ownership, such as registration and
listing fees and other stockholder service costs. Relative to
the market value of the pubtic firm, these explicit costs
can be significant. For example, in the early 1980s,
estimates of the costs of public ownership incurred annual-
ly ranged from $30,000 to $200,000. The value of the
stream of this annual cost (for an indefinite time) dis-
counted at a rate of 10 percent, ranges from $300,000 to
$2,000,000, whereas the median value of a sample of 72
firms attempting to go private between 1973 and 1980 was
$2,838,000. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) and
references cited therein.
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ager’s incentives with those of the owners can-
not be enforced completely.
To see why the distinction between owner-
ship and managerial control can be important
when monitoring incentives are weaker, con-
sider the following extreme example in which a
firm has such a large number of owners that
no individual finds it worthwhile to monitor the
manager at all. As is typical in any publicly
owned firm, the owners have voting rights, but
do not participate directly in the daily opera-
tions and decision-making of the firm. Suppose
that the firm’s manager, who exercises full con-
trol over these operations, has the opportunity
to undertake a new project whereby the
present value of cash flows (that is, revenues
net of operating costs) can increase by $100. If
the manager had a fixed salary and no owner-
ship claims in the firm, he would be completely
indifferent between exploiting this opportunity
and not doing so, as long as the expansion re-
quired no additional time by the manager. If the
expansion actually required any additional time,
however, he might well choose to forgo the op-
portunity; after all, what’s in it for him?
In this example, the distinction between
ownership and control is meaningful because
the manager does not fully bear the wealth con-
sequences of his actions. In the absence of ef-
fective monitoring by the owners, the decisions
of the manager, acting on his own behalf, are
not likely to maximize the owners’ wealth; in-
stead, they will maximize the manager’s utility.
As the distinction between ownership and
control becomes less clear, the conflict of in-
terests between owners and managers becomes
less severe. In the example above, if the
manager owned a fraction of the firms’ stock,
say 5 percent, he would be less reluctant to in-
itiate the new project; the additional cash flow
created by the new project would increase the
total value of his stock and wealth by $5. Never-
theless, the manager would not act entirely on
behalf of all the owners unless the marginal
gain from doing so, $5 in this example, exceeded
the marginal value of his time used in other
ways, including leisure.
The problems that potentially arise from the
distinctionbetween ownership and control, called
“agency problems,” explain why we observe
managerial contracts that are more complicated
than those that simply specify a fixed income.
The problem of “incomplete monitoring” ex-
plains why the observed managerial contracts
are less complicated than those that could
perfectly remove the conflict of interests be-
tween owners and managers. A contract that
partially links the manager’s income to the
firm’s characteristics observed easily by
stockholders—for example, sales, profits or the
firm’s stock performance—could help alleviate
the conflict.” A change in the organizational
structure of the firm, such as that engendered
by an LBO, however, is another and potentially
more effective method to circumvent the firm’s
organizational inefficiencies attributable to the
meaningful separation of control and
ownership.
In a going-private transaction, the interests of
owners and the manager generally are closely,
if not fully, reconciled. Once the manager be-
comes the owner, there is no conflict; the
wealth consequences of the manager’s actions
are entirely internalized by the firm’s
reorganization. Even when a third party (an-
other company or an individual) finances the
purchase, monitoring possibilities improve, sim-
ply because the transaction decreases the
number of owners—or, equivalently, concen-
trates the ownership of the firm—thereby rais-
ing the level of monitoring and the possibility
that enforceable contracts can be designed to
resolve the conflict of interests more effectively.
By improving the organizational efficiency of
the firm through a change of ownership, the
LBO can increase the firm’s earnings.’’
“Note that a manager who dislikes risk would not willingly
enter into a wage contract specifying that his compensa-
tion be a function only of the market value of the firm’s
stock. Doing so would involve taking on a large amount of
risk—i.e., possible, large fluctuations in income that are
not entirely under his control. Provided that there is com-
petition in the market for managers, owners of the firm
must bear some of the risks and offer a compensation
schedule such that risks are shared by owners and
managers. Bennett (1989), however, reports that ex-
ecutives increasingly are taking on some ofthe risks, in
the sense that the link between their salaries and the
market value of the firm, through long-term incentive
schemes (such as stock options and restricted stock), has
become substantial over the past decade. In the absence
of complete monitoring, the problems that typically arise
from the distinction between ownership and control are be-
ing partly mitigated by tying executive compensation to the
performance of the firm.
16An inefficient organization of a firm provides a motivation
for others to take over that firm. Note that such a takeover
need not involve taking that firm private. Rather, the
takeover is necessary to reorganize the firm to effect a
higher concentration of ownership.
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The Advantages of Highly
Leveraged Financing
That most going-private transactions are
financed with a large proportion of debt sug-
gests that leveraging itself must augment the
potential gains from the buyout. That is, the
high degree of leveraging in the buyout need
not indicate that the buyers do not have the re-
quisite cash for the transaction.
One widely mentioned source of gain from ex-
tensive leveraging is based on the incentive
structure of the tax system. Because interest
payments on debt are tax deductible, debt
financing is relatively more attractive (ceteris
paribus) than other methods of finance. The
double taxation of dividends, first as corporate
income and then as shareholder income, further
increases the incentive to issue or sell debt to
finance the purchase of the firm.
The gain from leveraged financing, however,
need not be restricted to reducing the tax liabil-
ity of the target firm. Another motive for the
use of debt finance stems from the misalign-
ment of the manager’s incentives with those of
the owners in cases where the firm faces low
growth prospects and a large “free cash flow.””
When the firm’s cash flow exceeds what is
necessary to finance its own projects that are
expected to yield positive (discounted) net
revenues, the firm is said to have a positive free
cash flow. That is, the firm has reached its op-
timal size; additional projects to expand its
operations would not maximize its profits.
There are cases, however, in which the
manager of a firm that has reached its optimal
size might choose not to maximize the share-
holders’ wealth by paying out the free cash
flow in the form of dividends. For example, if
the manager’s compensation were linked to the
firm’s growth in sales, he would have a greater
incentive to invest the free cash in any project
that increases the firm’s sales, even if the pro-
ject’s net return would be insufficient to main-
tain the firm’s value. The incentive to use the
free cash inefficiently (from the stockholders’
and society’s perspective) to increase the firm’s
size is greater if the manager values his power
as measured by the amount of resources under
his control.’~In this case, the market value of
the stock and the wealth of existing
shareholders will not be maximized.
The problem of free cash flow, a particular
type of agency problem, can be mitigated in a
buyout that is financed with debt. Issuing debt
and using the entire proceeds to purchase equi-
ty in an LEO enables the stockholders to cap-
ture the present value of the future free cash
flow that otherwise would be used inefficiently.
The firm’s increased leveraged position after the
transaction, in effect, imposes a binding commit-
ment on the manager to not waste future cash
flow; specifically, the manager cannot repudiate
the firm’s debt obligation to pay out the future
free cash flow as interest payments because the
bondholders could then push the firm into
bankruptcy. By circumventing or reducing the
agency problem associated with free cash flow,
the use of debt essentially improves the produc-
tive efficiency of the firm.
Evidence
The empirical observation that the purchase
price in an LBO is, on average, considerably
higher than the market price before the LBO
announcement suggests that these transactions
have increased the value of the target firm and,
hence, the wealth of the shareholders.’° The
observed gain to shareholders is consistent with
the notion that market participants at least ex-
pect the changes brought about by the LBO ac-
tivity to be productive.20
The basic idea here is that by increasing the
efficiency with which the firm’s resources are
used, the LBO transaction is expected to in-
17Jensen (1986, 1988). Also see “Management Brief: The “The issue of whether merger and acquisition activity in
Way the Money Goes” (1989) for a brief discussion of this general is productive has also received attention by
hypothesis as well as others to explain the increasing researchers in finance as well as the news media. See
degree of leveraging by corporations in recent years and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) and Jensen and Ruback
Laderman (1989a) for a discussion of the concept of free (1983) for recent reviews of the empirical studies on the
cash flow and its relation to cash flow and operating effects of merger and takeover activity. These studies
generally indicate that stockholders gain, on average, from
this activity in the market for corporate control. Also, see
Ott and Santoni (1985) who present a useful theoretical
discussion of the productiveness of mergers and acquisi-
tions and place this activity into an historical perspective.
cash flow.
“Of course, free cash flow could also explain the growing
acquisition activitythat has generated losses to
stockholders. See Jensen (1986, 1988) for details.
“See the evidence cited in footnotes 11 and 12.
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crease economic earnings, which would even-
tually be paid out as dividends. Because the
price of a firm’s stock is equal, in theory, to the
expected present discounted value of future
dividends, the transaction also raises the price
of the stock. In equilibrium, the gains to stock-
holders or the premium paid over the market
price before the transaction should be identical
to the expected increase in the present dis-
counted value of economic earnings to the
target firm.2’
In an attempt to identify the sources of the
increase in value from LBOs, one recent study
found that the increase in the market price of
the target firm’s stock is largely explained by its
cash flow as a fraction of the market value of
its equity before the transaction.22 This evidence
suggests that, with greater cash flow and the
greater agency costs potentially associated with
that flow, there is more room to improve the
firm’s productive efficiency and, accordingly, to
increase the firm’s value. Indeed, although dif-
ferences in the firm’s tax liabilities are associ-
ated with significant differences in the observed
magnitudes of the premiums, measures of the
firm’s tax liability do not add statistically signifi-
cant information for predicting the market-
valued premium above the information provided
by the cash flow measure.2’ Hence, the ex-
pected gains from the LEO transactions appear
to be over-and-above the tax advantages of debt
finance.
SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE SOCIAL
VALUE OF LBOs
Despite the gains typically realized by a target
firm’s shareholders, some observers have ex-
pressed doubt about the benefits of LBOs.
These doubts stem from two types of potential
“bad” effects of LBOs: wealth redistributions
and increased instability of the economy.
LBOs and Wealth Redistributions
One version of the redistribution criticism is
the claim that LBOs generate gains for the
stockholders at the expense of those holding the
target firm’s original bonds; the redistribution
presumably results from a reduction in the
“For example, in the simple case where expected future
dividends, d, for t>0, grow at a constant rate, g, the price
of the firm’s stock can be written as ~.. r is the con-
r—g
stant discount rate appropriately adjusted for risk, and d,
is next period’s dividend payment. Hence, by increasing
expected dividends (d, or g)—or, equivalently, expected
economic earnings—the transaction can increase the
market value of the firm’s stock.
Assuming that market participants correctly value the
firm’s stock, the observed increases in the stock price cast
some doubt on the general criticism of activity in the
market for corporate control, that managers are exploiting
opportunities for short-term gains at the expense of tong-
term performance. Rather, this activity effectively removes
myopic incentives so as to increase long-term economic
earnings. Of course, the claim that observed unusual in-
creases in the stock price supports the hypothesis that
mergers and acquisitions are productive presumes that
capital markets are efficient. In particular, firms are not
systematically undervalued (given public information) and
daily changes in the price of the firm’s stock reflect new
information that is made availableto the public and is rele-
vant for determining the firm’s value. Otherwise, the
observed increase in the stock price could merely reflect a
re-evaluation of the firm’s productiveness, without any fun-
damental change expected to arise from this activity in the
market for corporate control. 22Lehn and Poulsen (1988), table 6, p. 54. The measure of
cash flow used in their empirical analysis, however, does
not control for the firm’s growth prospects and so only
crudely captures the firm’s “free cash flow.” But in a
subsequent analysis, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), using un-
distributed cash flow (that is, the firm’s after-tax cash flow
net of interest and dividend payments) and attempting to
control for the firm’s growth prospects, get similar results
for LBOs between 1984 and 1987 (table V, p. 782). Also,
Lehn and Poulsen (1989), table Ill, p. 778, find that firms
going private have a significantly higher flow of un-
distributed cash flow as a fraction of their equity value and
possibly lower growth prospects than a control group of
firms.
Recently, Mitchell and Lehn (1988), who attempt to iden-
tify the source of gains to shareholders in takeover activi-
ty, present some preliminaryevidence to support the
hypothesis that the growth in productive takeover activity
is partly an attempt to prevent the target firm from using
free cash flow in an unprofitable way or to reverse the
earlier unprofitable takeover activity due to the free cash
flow problems.
“Lehn and Poulsen (1988, 1989). Lehn and Poulsen (1988),
table 9, p. 60, divide their sample into two equal sub-
samples according to the magnitude of the firm’s tax
liability as a fraction ofthe market value of the firm’s
outstanding equity before the transaction. They find that
the mean market-valued premium for those firms with the
higher tax liability measure was 47.7 percent, whereas that
for firms with the lower measure of tax liability was 32.1
percent. The difference in the premiums for the two sub-
samples cannot be due to chance alone. (See footnote 11
for their definition of the market-valued premium.)
However, the firm’s tax liability does not explain variation
in the premium not already explained by variation in the
firm’s undistributed cash flow. See Lehn and Poulsen
(1989), table V, p. 782. Also, they do not find a significant
difference between the mean tax liability for firms that
went private and that for a control group of firms (table Ill,
p. 778).
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market value of the firm’s outstanding debt.2~
The value of debt allegedly falls because the
target firm’s increased leveraged position,
typically in the form of low-quality, high-
yielding (junk) bonds, increases the probability
that its future revenues will be insufficient to
cover its higher interest payments. That is, the
value of the firm’s bonds outstanding before the
announcement of the LBO drops because market
participants believe that the probability of
default has increased as a result of the LBO
transaction.’5
Even if LBOs were to redistribute wealth in
this way, however, whether or not public policy
should aim to discourage LEO activity is not ob-
vious.’°Economics has nothing meaningful to
say about the “fairness” of wealth redistribu-
tions that leave social wealth unchanged. The
key economic issue is whether LBOs reduce the
market value of the firm’s outstanding debt by
more or less than the increase in the value of
its outstanding stock. If the net change in the
value of stockholders’ and bondholders’ claims
on the firm is negative, then LBOs reduce social
wealth. In this case, LBOs would be socially in-
efficient and public policy to limit such activity
could be justified.
The evidence discussed above, however, casts
some doubt on the validity of the claim that
LBOs merely redistribute wealth among those
having claims in the firm with no net gain to
society. Specifically, the alleged positive effect of
the increase in leveraging on the firm’s default
probability should not emerge. If such an effect
were to emerge, it would first be reflected in
the price of the stock. Because the new owners
of the firm will be the residual claimants of the
firm’s earnings, they take on the greatest amount
of risk in the transaction. The bidders must ex-
pect that, while future debt-servicing increases,
the LEO will improve the firm’s productivity so
as to augment the future cash flow available for
servicing that increased debt obligation; other-
wise, they would not be willing to pay such a
premium to purchase the firm.
Confirming this line of reasoning, empirical
studies indicate that LEO announcements have
an insignificant effect on the market value of
the firm’s outstanding debt. One study found
that, for a sample of 13 target firms between
1980 and 1984, the average percentage change
in the bond price from 10 days before to 10
days after the announcement was -1.42 percent,
much smaller than the average 7.21 percent
decline in the Wall Street Journal’s 20-bond in-
dex over the same period.’~Another study of 20
LBOs between 1984 to 1988 found that the like-
lihood of the bond price falling was virtually
equal to the likelihood of the price increasing
upon the LEO announcement.’8 However, a re-
cent study found that, for 33 successful buyouts
between 1974 and 1985, the default risk of the
target firms’ bonds (as measured by Moody’s)
typically increased.’°
Another version of the redistribution
hypothesis is based on the widely cited reason
for the recent growth of LBOs—that is, the tax
system produces a bias for debt finance. By
reducing the firm’s tax liability, the LEO in-
creases the firm’s after-tax earnings and, conse-
quently, the market value of the firm’s stock.
According to some observers, the observed in-
crease in stock value takes place at the expense
of taxpayers. Because these transactions permit
the target firms to reduce their tax liability, tax
gains to the target firms realized by the share-
holders are said to be offset indirectly by in-
creasing the tax liabilities of all taxpayers.3°
Regardless of the issues related to the fairness
of the tax system, the critical economic issue
for public policy toward LEOs is whether the
‘4For example, see “A Big Event for American Bonds”
(1988) and, “When Industry Borrows Itself” (1988).
‘5The value of preferred stock is also said to fall. Specified
payments or dividends, distributed to holders ofthese
stock shares unless earnings are insufficient to cover in-
terest payments on outstanding debt, are fixed like interest
payments on debt.
‘°Theforms of protection, offered in financial markets,
against such losses weakens the role for public interven-
tion. See, for example, “The Debt Deduction” (1988) and
and Poulsen (1988).
“Lehn and Poulsen (1988), table 8, p. 57. Also, see Marais,
Schipper and Smith (1989) who similarly find that bond
values did not significantly decline following 290 proposed
management buyouts between 1974 and 1985. Further-
more, preferred stock values do not appear to be
significantly affected by the announcement.
28Fortier (1989). Out of a sample of 20 LBOs, the bond
prices of only eight target firms fell. The average change
in price as a percentage of the bond’s face value, abstrac-
ting from general market interest rate movements was only
-0.50 percent, too small to be attributed to the LBO an-
nouncement. However, she finds that after January 1987,
when the elimination of preferential tax treatment of capital
gains made debt finance even more attractive, bond-
holders, on average, experienced significant losses (5.1
percent).
29Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989), tables 8 and 9, pp.
184-85.
3cFor example, see Lowenstein (1986).
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Table 3
Growth of GNP and Debt
1960-69 1970-19 1980-68
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would increase later; increased future tax
revenues would offset partially, if not fully, the
loss in tax revenues now due to the use of debt
finance in the LEO transaction.
Macroeconomic Instability
Some individuals have argued that the recent
activity in the market for corporate control has
contributed to an excessive growth of debt by
nonfinancial borrowers in this decade.” As
table 3 shows, the growth of nominal GNP ex-
ceeded that of total debt of nonfinancial bor-
rowers slightly during the 1960s and was mar-
ginally smaller in the 1970s. In the 1980s,
however, the growth of total outstanding debt
for nonfinancial borrowers exceeded that of
nominal GNP by more than 3 percentage points.
Table 3 indicates that all borrowers contributed
to this recent trend except for the farm, and
nonfarm, noncorporate sectors. But the primary
contributors appear to be the U.S. government
and the corporate sector.”
Some observers have suggested that the
growth rates of corporate and public debt,
which appear high relative to GNP growth in
the 1980s, especially by post-World War II stan-
dards, reflect a greater instability in financial
markets and, hence, the economy. According to
this view, for any given slowdown in economic
activity, the higher degree of leveraging by firms
implies a greater likelihood that these firms will
be forced to default on their debt obligations; if
the affected creditors who suffer from deficient
cash flows, in turn, are unable to service their
own debt, then the severity of a slowdown in
economic activity will be aggravated as the inci-
dence of default is transmitted throughout the
financial system.’4
Despite the fact that the recent growth in cor-
porate debt and LEO activity appear to be strik-
ing, whether or not these new trends indicate a
threat to the stability of the financial system or
“See evidence cited in footnote 23.
“See Friedman (1989) and Kaufman (1989), for example.
Gilbert and Ott (1985) found that the increase in corporate
merger activity financed with debt (including LBO5) ac-
counted for a substantial amount of the unusually large
growth of business loans in the first half of 1984.
“During the 1980s, corporate debt growth has exceeded
nominal GNP growth in all but two years and by as much
as 9.96 percentage points. See also Bernanke and Camp-
bell (1988), who provide a detailed analysis of the recent
trends in corporate debt. They look at disaggregated data
in an attempt to determine the financial stability or solven-
cy of those firms most likely to default on their debt
obligations.
‘4See, for example, “Taking the Strain of America’s
Leverage” (1988) and Ferguson (1989), Kaufman (1986,
1989), Friedman (1986, 1989) and Greenspan (1989,
especially p. 269). Friedman (1989) also argues that
“because of the increased likelihood of debtors’ distress in
the event of an economic downturn, the Federal Reserve
system is likely to be less willing either to seek or to per-
mit a business recession in the United States.” According
to Friedman, a consequence of the higher degree of
leveraging is the prospect for greater inflation.
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the economy is not obvious. If LBOs or, more
generally, merger and acquisition activity had
no other benefit than providing a channel
through which tax advantages of debt finance
could be realized, then the growth of debt that
only recently has significantly exceeded the
growth of nominal output might seem alarming.
The existing empirical evidence briefly
discussed above, however, suggests that LBOs
provide anticipated gains over and above the
tax gains to the target firm. Since these an-
ticipated benefits include enhancing the earn-
ings potential of the firm, simply comparing
debt growth with nominal GNP growth does not
provide a complete picture from which to iden-
tify the effects of debt growth on the stability
of financial markets. Specifically, the increased
debt as a fraction of nominal output could re-
flect an increase in expected future cash flows
relative to the prior post-World War II trends.
In this case, the increased debt would be
associated with a rise in the market value of
firms’ assets. Indeed, aggregate debt-to-asset ra-
tios, which more accurately indicate financial
stability, hardly changed on net from 1969 to
1986. For example, one measure of this ratio us-
ing “flow of funds” data, rose from 34 percent
in 1969 to 42 percent in 1986, peaking in 1974
at 51 percent.’5
Aggregate debt-to-asset ratios, however, can
be misleading, because they mask the financial
condition of those firms with especially high
debt-to-asset ratios. In fact, such firms have ex-
hibited only a slightly higher increase in debt-to-
asset ratios than would be suggested by the ag-
gregate data. Specifically, a recent study found
that while, for a full sample of firms, the debt-
to-asset ratio fell from 31 percent in 1969 to 27
percent in 1986, for those firms in the 99th per-
centile (that is, having a higher debt-to-asset
ratio than 99 percent of the sample), debt-to-




The existing evidence cannot rule out the
validity of all critical concerns about LEOs. in
particular, most research on LBOs has examined
the impact of the transaction on pre-huyout
stockholders and bondholders of the firm. As
such, these studies provide evidence on finan-
cial market participants’ expectations about the
impact of i,BOs on the target firms perfor-
mance. Although these studies generally indicate
that these transactions on average are expected
to generate gains beyond tax liability reductions,
we will have to wait to see if these gains are ac-
tually realized. Several recent studies on post-
buyout performance of LEO firms provide evi-
dence suggesting that those transactions, on
average, have actually improved the firm’s per-
formance; however, evidence is preliminary and
particularly subject to many methodological prob-
lems due to data limitations.’~Nevertheless, with-
out evidence that LEOs are harmful or are like-
ly to be harmful to the economy, policy actions
to restrict LBO activity seem to be premature;
indeed, such restrictions could themselves be
harmful, especially if LEO activity actually
enhances the productiveness of the target firms.
‘5Bernanke and Campbell (1988), table 3, p. 98.
36lbid., table 5, p. 104. As predicted by the “free cash flow”
theory, the study found a dramatic increase in real and
nominal interest expenses as a percentage of cash flows
over this same period (see tables 6 and 7, pp. 106-07).
Because expectations about increased future cash flows
(as reflected in the increased market value of the firms’
outstanding assets that has left debt-to-asset ratios virtual-
ly unchanged on net from 1969 to 1986) might not be
fulfilled, however, concerns about recent trends in debt
growth are not entirely unwarranted. Another recent study
found that the default rate on junk bonds, commonly used
to finance transactions in the market for corporate control,
could be as high as 34 percent, much higher than the
average 2.5 percent reported by an earlier study. See
Laderman (1989l~)for a brief discussion of these two
studies and Mitchell (1989) and Fidler and Cohen (1989)
for discussions of a more recent study by Moody’s In-
vestors Services, Inc. Also see Passell (1989) who sum-
marizes two other studies’ findings that the greater risk of
default has been compensated by higher realized returns
on average.
‘7For example, see Deveny (1989), who discusses a recent
study indicating that companies involved in the market for
corporate control have not, on average, exhibited a
decrease in expenditures on research and development,
as predicted by some critics. Also, see Yago (1989), who
reports one study’s finding that target firms of manage-
ment buyouts are less likely to close plants than are other
firms. Francis (1989) discusses evidence from another
study indicating that, upon a change in ownership of a
firm, the ratio of the administrative employees to plant
employees fell 11 percent on average. Indeed, one study
found that for LBO firms between 1984 and 1986, average
annual growth of the firm’s productivity (measured by
sales per employee) increased from an average of 3.6 per-
cent before the transaction to 17.4 percent after thetran-
saction. See Yago (1989). Also, Palmeri (1989) recently
found that the stocks of 70 L80 target firms that subse-
quently went public performed significantly better than the
market since going public. But see Long and Ravenscraft
(1989) for a brief summary of a few other existing studies
providing mixed evidence on post-LBO performance anda
critical assessment of the validity of these studies.
FEDERAL RESE~EBANK OF St LOUIS33
Although the recent behavior of various debt-
to-asset ratios does not indicate a drastic deterio-
ration of corporate solvency, the higher debt-to-
income ratios do suggest some increased risk of
financial stress. That is, the recent behavior of
these latter ratios indicate a higher degree of
pressure on cash flows exerted by interest ex
penses (a reduction in liquidity), which could ex-
acerbate the severity of any given slowdown in
economic activity. To the extent the tax advan
tages of debt finance are not necessary to
realize the gains from LEO activity, as well as
from other highly leveraged transactions in the
market for corporate control, a change in
public policy might be warranted.
A widely discussed policy recommendation in-
tended to slow the growth of all corporate debt
involves eliminating the tax advantages of debt
finance, in particular, by eliminating the tax de-
ductibility of interest payments on debt’s
Another policy recommendation would involve
removing the double-taxation of dividends by
relieving the tax burden on dividends at the
corporate level or stockholder level. Whether
the latter approach to curb debt growth is polit-
ically feasible, given the wide concern about the
unprecedented growth in public debt along with
explicit commitments made by the administra-
tion to reduce the budget deficit, remains un-
clear. In any case, if, as suggested by the em-
pirical evidence, LBO activity has benefits in
addition to the tax advantages, these tax
reforms should be considered on their own
merits, not chiefly as a way to reduce LBO
activity.
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